The Japanese Occupation of Malaya and Singapore, 1941-45: A Social and Economic History

PAUL H. KRATOSKA formerly taught history at Universiti Sains Malaysia and the National University of Singapore. He is the publishing director of NUS Press.

NUS Press (2018)
407 pages

RM95.00

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The Japanese Occupation of Malaya and Singapore, 1941-45: A Social and Economic History was first published in 1998 and is now re-issued in a new edition that incorporates information from newly translated Japanese documents and other recent discoveries. The Japanese occupation divides the twentieth-century history of Malaysia into two parts, 1900-40 and 1945 onward, and has often been described as a major watershed, an event that put an end to the old order and created a new.

However, remarkably little is known about what happened during the years of the occupation, and its significance is often assumed rather than demonstrated. The academic literature on the period deals for the most part with military activity and the ordeal of Europeans held as prisoners of war or as civilian internees, and there are few studies concerning the local population. In Malaysia and Singapore those who experienced the occupation have kept its memory alive, but each succeeding generation finds their war stories less compelling, and young people know little about the events of the war years.

Popular understanding is in any case full of misconceptions: the war caused Britain to abandon its colonial empire; Japan conquered Malaya to obtain the peninsula’s rich natural resources; the Japanese ruled autocratically and used terror to control the population; the Chinese were hostile to the Japanese, the Malays collaborated, and the Indians were won over by the promise of support for Indian independence. These interpretations are commonplace, but are partial truths at best and include much that is inaccurate. The Second World War certainly contributed to Britain’s decision to give up its empire, but events in Malaya had little to do with that decision, and colonial rule ended in Malaya through a constitutional process twelve years after the Japanese surrender.

The natural resources of the peninsula far exceeded Japan’s wartime requirements, and the tin and rubber industries were a positive liability because these commodities no longer had a market and the large sector of the economy dependent on their production and export could not be sustained. Japanese rule in Malaya, after an initial period of savage repression that had adverse consequences for the remainder of the occupation, was carried out through communal organizations and pre-war administrative structures. The Japanese themselves, although they are remembered as cold and hostile, emerge from the historical record as somewhat inept, able to impose their will in specific instances but understanding too little of the country and its people, and commanding too little respect to be able to use their power effectively.

Most Chinese cooperated with the Japanese, even if reluctantly; Malays tended to be neutral and came to dislike Japanese rule, while many indians saw Japanese support for the independence movement in india at detrimental to their cause. Nearly everyone collaborated to some degree, but few did so because of a commitment to Japanese objectives as presented by the Japanese.

Japan invaded Malaya on 8 December 1941, and by 15 February 1942 had conquered the entire Malay peninsula and secured the surrender of British forces in Singapore. The occupation lasted until early September 1945, when Malaya was transferred to a British Military Administration under the surrender agreement Japan had accepted on 15 August 1945. The attack on Malaya was timed to coincide with the Japanese invasion of Hong Kong and the Philippines, and the raid on Pearl Harbor, and these actions marked the start of open hostilities.

Previously, Japan had placed forces in Indochina under an agreement with the Vichy government in France, and had developed close ties with the government of Thailand. After the fall of Malaya, Japan conquered the Netherlands Indies, Burma and the Andaman and Nicobar islands, and attended their presence in the South Pacific beyond the mandated territories they already controlled. but then the advance stopped, although Japanese forces threatened Australia, and in 1944 launched an assault along the eastern frontier of British India. The captured territories covered a vast area, and Japan found it difficult to maintain supply lines and communications. Moreover, by the end of 1942 the Japanese had suffered the first of a series of defeats which brought the Allies back into Southeast Asia and nearly to the coast of Japan. By August 1945. when the japanese capitulated, Allied forces had retaken Burma and the Philippines, and an invasion of Malaya was imminent.

The origins of the conflict lie in a set of relationships that had taken shape over the preceding half-century, and in the politics of the 1930s. Japan’s industrial economy depended on the import of raw materials and the export of manufactured goods. Despite a general shift toward protectionism in Europe toward the end of the nineteenth century, Asian markets remained open, and Japan prospered in this trade environment. During the Depression. the colonial powers tried to contain as much economic activity as possible within empire trading blocs, and to ensure that there was a balance of imports and exports in trade conducted with places outside of these blocs.

Japan sold its exports to Southeast Asia in markets where it bought very little, and steps taken by the British, Dutch and US colonial administrations to limit the import of Japanese goods into territories they controlled posed a threat to this sector of Japanese trade. Far more critical, however, was the question of Japanese imports from Southeast Asia, which included oil and metals vital bath to Japanese industry to the military. Restrictions imposed on these products at the end of the decade pushed matters to the point of crisis.

Although much of Japan’s economic success was based on foreign trade, the country also pursued a second strategy during the half century that preceded the Pacific War by laying the foundations for an Asian empire, first taking control of Korea and Taiwan and then moving into Manchuria and northern China. These areas contained important industrial centres, and southern China and Southeast Asia complemented them, offering populous markets along with supplies of food and raw materials. During the 19303, the right-wing elements in power in Japan responded to the economic pressures the country was facing with an aggressive military build-up and a powerful nationalist appeal, thereby increasing Japan’s diplomatic isolation. Japan’s move into Southeast Asia was an attempt to ensure that Japanese industry had sufficient natural resources and an adequate market within the ambit of the Japanese political system, and by denying rival powers access to strategic locations in the region. Japan’s concept of a Greater East Asian Co-Prosperity Sphere (the term dates only from 1940) presented this policy in a way that suggested benefits for the entire region.

Japan considered Malaya and Sumatra “the nuclear zone of the Empire’s plans for the Southern area”, and saw the Malay Peninsula as “the economic and communication axis for the entire Southern area”. Singapore also had considerable strategic importance because the British naval base located there provided a base for military operations against Japan, while in Japanese hands the naval base would extend the range of the Imperial Navy by some 2,500 miles. Following the conquest, Malaya became a key sector in Japan’s defensive perimeter, guarding western approaches to the South China Sea and linking Japanese bases in the Asian mainland with those in the Indonesian Archipelago. Economically, the significance of the occupation of Malaya lay in the denial of its resources to the Allied Forces rather than in the contribution those resources might make to the Japanese war effort, although bauxite, mined on a modest scale in Johor and in substantial quantities in the Riau Archipelago. was of considerable importance to Japan.

The concept of an Asian economic sphere, uniting industrialized northeastern Asia with a region that could supply it with raw materials and provide a market for its manufactured goods, could not be realized. The primary task of administrators in the occupied territories was to support the war effort by supplying raw materials as needed, and by ensuring that peace and oak: prevailed behind the front lines at a time when Japan’s combat forces were fully engaged in dealing with the Allied Powers. Far from participating in an integrated economic sphere, territories within the Japanese empire were forced to become self-sufficient. In Malaya the Japanese administration succeeded in maintaining order, but faced an intractable economic situation, mesmerized by unemployment, inflation, a flourishing black market and ever-worsening shortages of food and basic consumer goods.

Japanese activities during the occupation fall into a chronological sequence that begins with consolidation of their power during 1942, followed by economic and administrative reforms in 1943 that moved the country toward centralized economic planning. By 1944. however, food shortages and inflation were out of control, and the administration was unable to deal effectively with either problem. By the end of 1944. Allied planes were appearing in the skies over Malaya, and during 1945 the Japanese were preoccupied with preparing for an invasion which they were unlikely to be able to repel.

For the local population, the sequence might be described differently. In 1941 the country was prosperous and goods were abundant. Conditions deteriorated steadily under Japanese rule, first because hoarding and black market activity pushed prices up and made it difficult to obtain food, clothing and medicines, and later because the supplies which remained were insufficient to meet dr country’s needs. What began as an irritating necessity to make do with less became for some people a grim struggle for survival.

The occupation is an episode in a large number of different stories—the history of Asia, the history of the British Empire, the history of the Second Wadi War, the history of Malaya, the collective histories of the Malay and China and Indian populations and the individual histories of the 5.5 million people who were in the country during the occupation. The histories of Asia, of the British empire and of the Second World War have been written often and well, and The Japanese Occupation of Malaya and Singapore, 1941-45: A Social and Economic History will do little to alter established understandings of those topics. It concerns instead the impact of these years on Malaya, on its economy and society, and on the people who lived there.

For the most part, the Japanese in this The Japanese Occupation of Malaya and Singapore, 1941-45: A Social and Economic History are seen through Malayan eyes. They appear as an alien presence, powerful and threatening, despite conciliatory gestures. They promise a prosperous future free of corruption but oversee an impoverished and corrupt regime. When individuals emerge from this mass, some are brutal and some kind, some clever and some fatuous. There are young men who are homesick and innocent and occasionally fall in love, middle-aged civil servants who struggle with shortages and a faltering economy, scholars who appreciate the art and literature of the Chinese, and racists who despise anyone who does not conform to Japanese standards. There are men who fervently believe in Japan’s self-described mission, and men who cynically exploit Japan’s momentary supremacy. Lurking in the background is the Japanese military, shadowy but pervasive, taking precedence over all else.

Accounts of the occupation tend to present the people of Malaya as meek victims. Victims they may have been, but they can hardly be described as meek. A substantial proportion of the Chinese population consisted of young working class men, famous for their coarse speech and truculent disregard for authority. The Malays, living as families in rural villages, presented a quieter Facade but were equally ready to ignore Japanese directives that ran counter to their interests. and if the Japanese regime gave the Malays little to oppose, it also offered little they wished to support. Some of the Indian soldiers brought to Malaya by the British to fight against Japan took part in an Indian National Army created to liberate India, but many others suffered and died in detention camps; the tragic fate of Tamil labourers during the occupation was to die in large numbers while working on Japanese construction projects, or from malnutrition and disease while trying to eke out a living growing food on the rubber estates.

Weight 0.640 kg
Dimensions 15.2 x 2.2 x 22.8 cm
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